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Abstract
We present a new system S for handling un-
certainty in a quantified modal logic (first-order
modal logic). The system is based on both prob-
ability theory and proof theory and is derived
from Chisholm’s epistemology. We concretize
Chisholm’s system by grounding his undefined and
primitive (i.e. foundational) concept of reason-
ableness in probability and proof theory. We dis-
cuss applications of the system. The system de-
scribed below is a work in progress; hence we end
by presenting a list of future challenges.
1 Introduction
We introduce a new system S for talking about uncertainty of
iterated beliefs in a quantified modal logic with belief opera-
tors. The quantified modal logic we use is based on the deon-
tic cognitive event calculus (DCEC ), which belongs to the
family of cognitive calculi that have been used in modeling
complex cognition. Here, we use a subset of DCEC that we
term micro cognitive calculus (µC ). Specifically, we add a
system of uncertainty derived from Chisholm’s epistemology
[Chisholm, 1987].1 The system S is a work in progress and
hence the presentation here will be abstract in nature.
One of our primary motivations is to design a system of un-
certainty that is easy to use in end-user facing systems. There
have been many studies that show that laypeople have diffi-
culty understanding raw probability values (e.g. see [Kaye
and Koehler, 1991]); and we believe that our approach bor-
rowed from philosophy can pave the way for systems that can
present uncertain statements in a more understandable format
to lay users.
S can be useful in systems that have to interact with hu-
mans and provide justifications for their uncertainty. As a
demonstration of the system, we apply the system to provide
a solution to the lottery paradox. Another advantage of the
system is that it can be used to provide uncertainty values
for counterfactual statements. Counterfactuals are statements
that an agent knows for sure are false. Among other cases,
1See the SEP entry on Chisholm for a quick overview
of Chisholm’s epistemology: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
chisholm/#EpiIEpiTerPriFou.
counterfactuals are useful when systems have to explain their
actions to users (If I had not done α, then φ would have hap-
pened). Uncertainties for counterfactuals fall out naturally
from our system. Before we discuss the calculus and present
S , we go through relevant prior work.
2 Prior Work
Members in the family of cognitive calculi have been used
to formalize and automate highly intensional reasoning pro-
cesses.2 More recently, using DCEC we have presented an
automation of the doctrine of double effect in [Govindara-
julu and Bringsjord, 2017].3 We quickly give an overview of
the doctrine to illustrate the scope and expressivity of cog-
nitive calculi such as DCEC . The doctrine of double ef-
fect is an ethical principle that has been shown to be used by
both untrained laypeople and experts when faced with moral
dilemmas; and it plays a central role in many legal systems.
Moral dilemmas are situations in which all available options
have both good and bad consequences. The doctrine states
that an action α in such a situation is permissible iff — (1) it
is morally neutral; (2) the net good consequences outweigh
the bad consequences by some large amount γ; and (3) at least
one or more of the good consequences are intended, and none
of the bad consequences are intended. The conditions require
both intensional operators and a calculus (e.g. the event cal-
culus) for modeling commonsense reasoning and the physical
world. Other tasks automated by cognitive calculi include the
false-belief task [Arkoudas and Bringsjord, 2008] and akra-
sia (succumbing to temptation to violate moral principles)
[Bringsjord et al., 2014].4 Each cognitive calculus is a sorted
(i.e. typed) quantified modal logic (also known as sorted first-
order modal logic). Each calculus has a well-defined syntax
and proof calculus. The proof calculus is based on natural
deduction [Gentzen, 1935], and includes all the introduction
2By “intensional processes”, we roughly mean processes that
take into account knowledge, beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. of
agents. Compare with extensional systems such as first-order logic
that do not take into account states of minds of other agents. This is
not be confused with “intentional” systems which would be modeled
with intensional systems. See [Zalta, 1988] for a detailed treatment
of intensionality.
3This work will be presented at IJCAI 2017.
4Arkoudas and Bringsjord [2008] introduced the general family
of cognitive event calculi to which DCEC belongs.
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and elimination rules for first-order logic, as well as inference
schemata for the modal operators and related structures.
On the uncertainty and probability front, there have been
many logics of probability, see [Demey et al., 2016] for an
overview. Since our system builds upon probabilities, our
approach could use a variety of such systems. There has
been very little work in uncertainty systems for first-order
modal logics. Among first-order systems, the seminal work
in [Halpern, 1990] presents a first-order logic with modified
semantics to handle probabilistic statements. We can use such
a system as the foundation for our work, and use it to define
the base probability function Pr used below. (Note that we
leave Pr unspecified for now.)
3 The Formal System
The formal system µC is a modal extension of the the event
calculus. The event calculus is a multi-sorted first-order logic
with a family of axiom sets. The exact axiom set is not im-
portant. The primary sorts in the system are shown below.
Sort Description
Agent Human and non-human actors.
Moment or Time Time points and intervals. E.g. simple, such as ti, or com-
plex, such as birthday(son( jack)).
Event Used for events in the domain.
ActionType Action types are abstract actions. They are instantiated at
particular times by actors. E.g.: “eating” vs. “jack eats.”
Action A subtype of Event for events that occur as actions by agents.
Fluent Used for representing states of the world in the event calcu-
lus.
Full DCEC has a suite of modal operators and inference
schemata. Here we focus on just two: an operator for belief B
and an operator for perception P. The syntax of and inference
schemata of the system are shown below. S is the set of all
sorts, f are the core function symbols, t shows the set of terms,
and φ is the syntax for the formulae.
Syntax
S ::=
{
Object
∣∣ Agent ∣∣ Self@ Agent ∣∣ ActionType ∣∣ Actionv Event ∣∣
Moment
∣∣ Formula ∣∣ Fluent ∣∣ Numeric
f ::=

action : Agent×ActionType→ Action
initially : Fluent→ Formula
holds : Fluent×Moment→ Formula
happens : Event×Moment→ Formula
clipped : Moment×Fluent×Moment→ Formula
initiates : Event×Fluent×Moment→ Formula
terminates : Event×Fluent×Moment→ Formula
prior : Moment×Moment→ Formula
t ::= x : S
∣∣ c : S ∣∣ f (t1, . . . , tn)
φ ::=
{
t :Formula
∣∣ ¬φ ∣∣ φ∧ψ ∣∣ φ∨ψ ∣∣ φ→ ψ ∣∣ φ↔ ψ
P(a, t,φ)
∣∣ B(a, t,φ)
The above calculus lets us formalize statements of the form
“John believes now that Mary perceived that it was raining.”
One formalization could be:
∃t < now : B
(
john,now,P
(
mary, t,holds(raining, t)
))
The figure below shows the inference schemata for µC . RP
captures that perceptions get turned into beliefs. RB is an
inference schema that lets us model idealized agents that have
their beliefs closed under the µC proof theory. While normal
humans are not deductively closed, this lets us model more
closely how deliberate agents such as organizations and more
strategic actors reason. Assume that there is a background set
of axioms Γ we are working with.
Inference Schemata
P(a, t1,φ1), Γ ` t1 < t2
B(a, t2,φ)
[RP]
B(a, t1,φ1), . . . ,B(a, tm,φm), {φ1, . . . ,φm} ` φ, Γ ` ti < t
B(a, t,φ)
[RB]
4 The Uncertainty System S
In the uncertainty system, we augment the belief modal op-
erators with a discrete set of uncertainty factors termed as
strength factors. The factors are not arbitrary and are based
on how derivable a proposition is for a given agent.
Chisholm’s epistemology has a primitive undefined binary
relation that he terms reasonableness with which he defines a
scale of strengths for beliefs one might have in a proposition.
Note that Chisholm’s system is agent free while ours is agent-
based. Let φ at ψ denote that φ is more reasonable than ψ to
an agent a at time t. We require that at be asymmetric: i.e.,
irreflexive and anti-symmetric. That is, for all φ, φ 6 at φ; and
for all φ and ψ,
(φ at ψ)⇒ (ψ 6 at φ)
We also require that at be transitive. In addition to these
conditions, we have the following five requirements govern-
ing how at interacts with the logical connectives ∧,¬ and
B (the first three conditions can be derived from the defintion
of  sketched out later):
[C∧1 ]
(
ψ1 at φ1
)
and
(
ψ2 at φ2
)⇒ (ψ1 at φ1∧φ2)
[C∧2 ]
(
ψ1∧ψ2 at φ
)⇒ [(ψ1 at φ)and (ψ2 at φ)]
[C¬] There is no φ such that (⊥ at φ) ; and for all φ(φ at ⊥)
[CB1 ]
(
B(a, t,φ) at B(a, t,¬φ)
)
⇒
(
B(a, t,φ) at ¬B(a, t,φ)
)
[CB2 ] For all φ,
[(
B(a, t,φ) at B(a, t,¬φ)
)
or(
B(a, t,¬φ) at B(a, t,φ)
) ]
We also add a belief consistency condition which requires
that: (
Γ ` Bp(a, t,φ)
)
⇔
(
Γ 6` Bp(a, t,¬φ)
)
For convenience, we define a new operator, the withhold-
ing operator W (this is simply syntactic sugar):
W(a, t,φ)≡ ¬B(a, t,φ)∧¬B(a, t,¬φ)
We now reproduce Chisholm’s system below. Note the for-
mula used in the definitions below are meta-formula and not
strictly in µC .
Strength Factor Definitions
Acceptable An agent a at time t finds φ acceptable iff with-
holding φ is not more reasonable than believing in φ.
B1(a, t,φ)⇔
W(a, t,φ) 6
a
t B(a, t,φ); or(
¬B(a, t,φ)∧¬B(a, t,¬φ)
)
6at B(a, t,φ)
Some Presumption in Favor An agent a at time t has some
presumption in favor of φ iff believing φ at t is more rea-
sonable than believing ¬φ at time t:
B2(a, t,φ)⇔
(
B(a, t,φ) at B(a, t,¬φ)
)
Beyond Reasonable Doubt An agent a at time t has beyond
reasonable doubt in φ iff believing φ at t is more reason-
able than withholding φ at time t:
B3(a, t,φ)⇔
 B(a, t,φ) 
a
t W(a, t,φ); or(
B(a, t,φ)at
(
¬B(a, t,φ)∧¬B(a, t,¬φ)
)
Evident A formula φ is evident to an agent a at time t iff φ is
beyond reasonable doubt and if there is a ψ such that be-
lievingψ is more reasonable for a at time t than believing
φ, then a is certain about ψ at time t.
B4(a, t,φ)⇔

B3(a, t,φ)∧
∃ψ :
[
B(a, t,ψ)at B(a, t,φ)
⇒B5(a, t,ψ)
]
Certain An agent a at time t is certain about φ iff φ is beyond
reasonable doubt and there is no ψ such that believing ψ
is more reasonable for a at time t than believing φ.
B5(a, t,φ)⇔
{
B3(a, t,φ)∧
¬∃ψ : B(a, t,ψ)at B(a, t,φ)
The above definitions are from Chisholm but more rigor-
ously formalized in µC . The definitions and the conditions
{[C∧1 ], [C∧2 , [C¬], [CB1 ], [CB1 ]} give us the following theo-
rem.
Theorem: Higher Strength subsumes Lower Strength
For any p and q, if p > q, we have: Bp(a, t,φ)⇒ Bq(a, t,φ)
Proof: B5⇒ B3 and B4⇒ B3 by definition. B5⇒ B4 by the
second clause in the definitions of B4 and B5. B3 ⇒ B1 by
the asymmetry property of at .
For B2 ⇒ B1, we have a proof by contradiction. Assume
that (in shorthand):
(Bφ B¬φ) but(¬Bφ∧¬B¬φ) Bφ
Using [CB1 ] on the former and [C∧2 ] on the latter, we get
Bφ ¬Bφ and ¬Bφ Bφ
Using transitivity, we get Bφ  Bφ. This violates irreflex-
ivity, therefore B2⇒ B1.
For B3⇒ B2, if the condition for B2 does not hold, by CB2
we have:
B¬φ Bφ
Using the condition for B3 and transitivity, we get
B¬φ ¬Bφ∧¬B¬φ
giving us B3¬φ, and we started with B3φ. This violates the
belief consistency condition. 
The definitions almost give us S except for the fact that at
is undefined. While Chisholm gives a careful and informal
analysis of the relation, he does not provide a more precise
definition. Such a definition is needed for automation. We
provide a three clause defintion that is based on both proba-
bilities and proof theory.
There are many probability logics that allow us to define
probabilities over formulae. They are well studied and under-
stood for propositional and first-order logics. Let L be the
set of all formulae in µC . Let Lp be a pure first-order subset
of L . Assume that we have the following partial probability
function defined over Lp5:
Pr : Agent×Moment×Formula 7→ R
Then we have the first clause of our definition for at .
Clause I. Defining 
If Pr(a, t,φ) and Pr(a, t,ψ) are defined then:(
φ at ψ
)
⇔
(
Pr(a, t,φ)> Pr(a, t,ψ)
)
We might not always have meaningful probabilities for all
propositions. For example, consider propositions of the form
“I believe that Jack believes that φ.” It is hard to get pre-
cise numbers for such statements. In such situations, we
might look at the ease of derivation of such statements given a
knowledge base Γ. 6 Given two competing statements φ and
ψ, we can say one is more reasonable than the other if we can
easily derive one more than the other from Γ. This assumes
that we can derive φ and ψ from Γ. We assume we have a cost
function ρ : Proof 7→R+ that lets us compute costs of proofs.
There are many ways of specifying such functions. Possi-
ble candidates are length of the proof, time for computing the
proof, depth vs breadth of the proof, unique symbols used in
the proof etc. We leave this choice unspecified but any such
function could work here. Let `a,t denote provability w.r.t. to
agent a at time t.
5Something similar to the system in [Halpern, 1990] that ac-
counts for probabilities as statistical information or degrees of belief
can work.
6Another possible mechanism can leverage Dempster-Shafer
models of uncertainty for first-order logic [Nunez et al., 2013].
Clause II. Defining 
If one of Pr(a, t,φ) and Pr(a, t,ψ) is not defined, but if Γ `a,t φ
and Γ `a,t ψ:(
φ at ψ
)
⇔
(
ρ
(
Γ `a,t φ
)
< ρ
(
Γ `a,t ψ
))
Clauses I and II might not always be applicable as the
premises in the definitions might not always hold. A more
common case could be when we cannot derive the proposi-
tions of interest from our background set of axioms Γ. For
example, if we are interested in the uncertainty values for
statements that we know are false, then it should be the case
that they be not derivable from our background set of axioms.
In this situation, we look at Γ and see what minimal changes
we can make to it to let us derive the proposition of interest.
Trivially, if we cannot derive φ from Γ, we can add it to Γ to
derive it, as Γ+φ ` φ. This is not desirable for two reasons.
First, simply adding to Γ might result in a contradiction. In
such cases we would be looking at removing a minimal set of
statements Λ from Γ. Second, we might prefer to add a more
simpler set of propositions Θ to Γ rather than φ itself to derive
φ. Recapping, we go from (1) to (2) below:
Γ 6` φ (1)
Γ∪Θ−Λ ` φ (2)
When we go from (1) to (2) we would like to modify the
background axioms as minimally as possible. Assume that
we have a similarity function pi for sets of formulae. We then
choose Θ and Λ as given below (Con[S] denotes that S is con-
sistent):
〈Θ,Λ〉= argmin
〈Θ,Λ〉
pi(Γ,Γ∪Θ−Λ); such that
{
Γ∪Θ−Λ ` φ; and
Con
[
Γ∪Θ−Λ]
Consider a statement such as “It rained last week” when
it did not actually rain last week, and another statement such
as “The moon is made of cheese.” Both statements denote
things that did not happen, but intuitively it seems that for-
mer should be more easier to accept from what we know than
the latter. There are many similarity measures which can help
convey this. Analogical reasoning is one such possible mea-
sure of similarity. If the new formulae are structurally similar
to existing formulae, then we might be more justified in ac-
cepting such formulae. For example, one such measure could
be the analogical measure used by us in [Licato et al., 2013].
Now we have the formal mechanism in place for defining
the final clause in our definition for our reasonableness. Let
δat (Γ,φ) be the distance between Γ and closest consistent set
under pi that lets us prove φ:
δat (Γ,φ)≡ min〈Θ,Λ〉
{
pi
(
Γ,Γ∪Θ−Λ)∣∣∣∣∣
(
Γ∪Θ−Λ) `at ψ; and
Con
[
Γ∪Θ−Λ]
}
Clause III. Defining 
If one of Pr(a, t,φ) and Pr(a, t,ψ) is not defined, and one of
Γ `a,t φ and Γ `a,t ψ does not hold, then
(
φ at ψ
)
⇔
[
δat (Γ,φ)< δ
a
t (Γ,ψ)
]
The final piece of S is inference rules for belief propagation
with uncertainty values. This is quite straightforward. Infer-
ences propagate uncertainty values from the premises with
the lowest strength factor; and inferences happen only with
beliefs that are close in their uncertainty values, with maxi-
mum difference being parametrized by u, with default u = 2.
Inference Schemata for S
P(a, t1,φ1), Γ ` t1 < t2
B5(a, t2,φ)
[RsP]
Bs1(a, t1,φ1), . . . ,Bsm(a, tm,φm),{φ1, . . . ,φm} ` φ,Γ ` ti < t
Bmin(s1,...,sm)(a, t,φ)
[RsB]
with max({s1, . . . ,sm})−min({s1, . . . ,sm})≤ u
5 Usage
In this section, we illustrate S by applying it solve prob-
lems of foundational interest such as the lottery paradox [Ky-
burg Jr, 1961, p. 197] and a toy version of a more real life
example, a murder mystery example (following in the tra-
ditions of logic pedagogy). Finally, we very briefly sketch
abstract scenarios in which S can be used to generate uncer-
tainty values for counterfactual statements and to generate ex-
planations for actions.
5.1 Paradoxes: Lottery Paradox
In the lottery paradox, we have a situation in which an agent a
comes to believe φ and ¬φ from a seemingly consistent set of
premises ΓL describing a lottery. Our solution to the paradox
is that the agent simply has different strengths of beliefs in
the proposition and its negation. We first go over the paradox
formalized in µC and then present the solution.
Let ΓL be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description
of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent
a is fully apprised. Assume that from ΓL it can be proved
that either ticket 1 will win or ticket 2 will win or . . . or ticket
1,000,000,000,000 will win. Lets write this (exclusive) dis-
junction as follows (here ⊕ is an exclusive disjunction):
ΓL ` win(t1)⊕win(t2)⊕ . . .⊕win(t1,000,000,000,000)
The paradox has two strands of reasoning. The first strand
yields B(a,now,φ) and the second strand yields B(a,now,¬φ)
with φ≡ ∃t : win(t).
Strand 1: Since a believes all propositions in ΓL, a can then
deduce from this the belief that there is at least one ticket that
will win, a proposition represented as:
S1 B
(
a,now,∃t : win(t))
Strand 2: From ΓL it can be proved that the probability of a
particular ticket ti winning is 10−12.
[
Pr
(
a,now,win
(
t1
))
= 10−12
]
∧
[
Pr
(
a,now,win
(
t2
))
= 10−12
]
∧ . . .∧
[
Pr
(
a,now,win
(
t1T
))
= 10−12
]
For the next step, note that the probability of ticket t1 win-
ning is lower than, say, the probability that if you walk outside
a minute from now, you will be flattened on the spot by a door
from a 747 that falls from a jet of that type cruising at 35,000
feet. Since you, the reader, have the rational belief that death
won’t ensue if you go outside (and have this belief precisely
because you believe that the odds of your sudden demise in
this manner are vanishingly small), the inference to the ratio-
nal belief on the part of a that t1 won’t win sails through —
and this of course works for each ticket. Hence we have as a
valid belief (though not derivable in µC from ΓL):
B
(
a,now,¬win(t1))∧B(a,now,¬win(t2))∧ . . .
∧B
(
a,now,¬win(t1T ))
From RB and above, we get:
B
(
a,now,¬win(t1)∧¬win(t2)∧ . . .∧¬win(t1T ))
Applying RB to the above and ΓL, we get:
S2 B
(
a,now,¬∃t : win(t)
)
The two strands are complete, and we have derived con-
tradictory beliefs labeled S1 and S2. Our solution consists of
two new uncertainty infused strands that result in beliefs of
sufficiently varying strengths that block inferences that could
combine them.
Strand 3: Assume that a is certain of all propositions in ΓL,
then using RsB, we have:
S3 B5
(
a,now,∃t : win(t))
Strand 4: Since Pr(a,now,win(ti)) < Pr(a,now,¬win(ti)),
using Clause I and the strength factor definitions, we have
now that for all ti
B2
(
a,now,¬win(ti)
)
Using the reasoning similar to that in Strand 2, we get:
S4 B2
(
a,now,¬∃t : win(t)
)
Strands 3 and 4 resolve the paradox. Note that RsB cannot
be applied to S3 and S4 and churn out arbitrary propositions,
as the default value of the u parameter in RsB requires beliefs
to be no more than 2 levels apart. 
5.2 Application: Solving a Murder
We look at a toy example in which an agent s has to solve a
murder that happened at time t3. s believes that either Alice
or Bob is the murderer. The agent knows that there is a gun
gun involved in the murder and that the owner of the gun at
t3 committed the murder. s also knows that Alice is the owner
of the gun initially at time t0.
Presumption in Favor of Alice Being the Murderer
From just these facts, the agent has some presumption for be-
lieving that Alice is the murderer.
Proof Sketch: All the above statements can be taken as cer-
tain beliefs B5 of s. For convenience, we consider the formu-
lae directly without the belief operators.
In order to prove the above, we need to prove that it is
easier for the agent to derive that Alice is the murderer than
to derive that Alice is not the murderer. First, to prove the
former, the agent just has to assume that Alice’s ownership
of the gun did not change from t0 to t3. Second, in order
for the agent to believe that Alice did not commit the mur-
der but Bob committed it, the agent must be willing to ad-
mit that something happened to change Alice’s ownership of
the gun from time t0 to t3 that results in Bob owning the
gun. One possibility is that Alice simply sold the gun to
Bob. Both the scenarios are shown as proofs in the Slate
theorem proving workspace [Bringsjord et al., 2008] in the
Appendix. Figure 1 shows a proof modulo belief operators of
B(s,now,Murderer(Alice)) from Γ∪Θ1 and Figure 2 shows
a proof of B(s,now,¬Murderer(Alice)) from Γ∪Θ2.
If we assume that Θ1 and Θ2 exhaust the space of allowed
additions, then it easy to see how syntactic measures of com-
plexity will yield that δat
(
Γ,Γ∪Θ1
)
< δat
(
Γ,Γ∪Θ2
)
as Θ2 is
more complex than Θ1. This lets us derive that s has some
presumption in favor of Murderer(Alice). 
What happens if the agent knows or has a belief with cer-
tainty that Alice’s ownership of the gun did not change from
t0 to t3?
Beyond Reasonable Doubt that Alice is the Murderer
If the agent is certain that Alice’s ownership of the gun did not
change from t0 till t3, the agent has beyond reasonable doubt
that she is the murderer.
Proof Sketch: In this case we directly have that:
Γ ` B(s,now,Murderer(Alice))
Γ 6 ` ¬B(s,now,Murderer(Alice))
Γ 6 ` ¬B(s,now,¬Murderer(Alice))
In order to flip the last two statements above, we need to mod-
ify Γ, but we can derive that Alice is the murderer without
any modifications, and since δat (Γ,Γ) = 0, it easier to believe
Alice is the murderer than to withhold that Alice is the mur-
derer. 
5.3 Counterfactuals
At time t, assume that an agent a believes in a set of propo-
sitions Γ and is interested in propositions holds( f , t ′) and
holds(g, t ′) with t ′ < t and:
Γ ` ¬holds( f , t ′)∧¬holds(g, t ′)
We may need non-trivial uncertainty values, but in this case,
Pr will assign a trivial value of 0 to both the propositions. We
can then look at closest consistent sets to Γ under δ:
Γ1 ` holds( f , t ′)
Γ2 ` holds(g, t ′)
Clause III from the definition for reasonableness gives us:
B
(
a, t,holds( f , t ′)
)
at B
(
a, t,holds(g, t ′)
)
⇔
δat (Γ,Γ1)< δ
a
t (Γ,Γ2)
5.4 Explanations
The definitions of the strength factors and reasonableness
above can be used to generate high-level schemas for expla-
nations. These schemas can be used instead of simply pre-
senting raw probability values to end-users. While we have
not fleshed out such explanation schemas, we illustrate one
possible schema. Say an agent performs an action α on the
basis of φ. In this case, the agent could generate an expla-
nation that at the highest level simply says that it is more
reasonable for the agent to believe φ than for the agent to
believe in ¬φ. The agent could then further explain why it
was reasonable for it by using one of the three clauses in the
reasonableness definition.
6 Inference Algorithm Sketch
Describing the inference algorithm in detail is beyond the
scope of this paper, but we provide a high-level sketch here.7
Our proof calculus is simply an extension of standard first-
order proof calculus under different modal contexts. For ex-
ample, if a believes that b believes in a set of propositions
Γ and Γ `FOL ψ, then a believes that b believes ψ. We
convert B(a, ta,B(b, tb,Q)) into the pure first-order formula
Q(context(a, ta,b, tb)) and use a first-order prover. The con-
version process is a bit more nuanced as we have to handle
negations, properly handle substitutions of equalities, uncer-
tainties and transform compound formulae within iterated be-
liefs.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented initial steps in building a system of un-
certainty that is both probability and proof theory based that
could lend itself to (1) solving foundational problems; (2) be-
ing useful in applications; (3) generating uncertainty values
for counterfactuals; and (4) building understandable explana-
tions.
Shortcomings of S can be cast as challenges, and many
challenges exist, some relatively easy and some quite hard.
Among the easy challenges are defining and experimenting
with different candidates for Pr, ρ, pi and δ. On the more dif-
ficult side, we have to come up with tractable computational
mechanisms for computing the min〈Θ,Λ〉 in the definition for
δ. Also on the difficult side, is the challenge of coming up ef-
ficient reasoning schemes. While we have an exact inference
algorithm, we believe that an approximate algorithm that se-
lectively discards beliefs in a large knowledge base during
7More details can be found here: https://goo.gl/2Vz2nJ
reasoning will be more useful. Future work also includes
comparison with other uncertainty systems and exploration
of conditions under which uncertainty values of S are simi-
lar/dissimilar with other systems (thresholded appropriately).
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A Appendix: Slate Proofs
The figures below are vector graphics and can be zoomed to
more easily read the contents.
Figure 1: Alice is the murder: B
(
s, t,Murderer(Alice)
)
Beliefs of s
 
⇥1
FOL  ⊢  ✓
Γ 6. ∀x (Murderer(x) ↔ Holds(Owns(x,gun),t3))
{Γ  6} Assume ✓
Γ 4. ∀x,t ((Holds(Owns(x,gun),t) ∧ holds(Owns(y,gun),t)) → (x = y))
{Γ  4} Assume ✓
Γ 3. Murderer(Bob) → ¬Murderer(Alice)
{Γ  3} Assume ✓
Γ 1. Murderer(Alice) ∨ Murderer(Bob)
{Γ  1} Assume ✓
Γ 5. Alice ≠ Bob
{Γ  5} Assume ✓
Γ 2. Murderer(Alice) → ¬Murderer(Bob)
{Γ  2} Assume ✓
Γ 8. ∀f,t ((Initially(f) ∧ ¬Clipped(t0,f,t)) → Holds(f,t))
{Γ  8} Assume ✓
Γ 7. Initially(Owns(Alice,gun))
{Γ  7} Assume ✓
Θ 1. ¬Clipped(t0,Owns(Alice,gun),t3)
{Θ 1} Assume ✓
10. Murderer(Alice)
{Γ  1,Γ 2,Γ 3,Γ 4,Γ 5,Γ 6,Γ 7,Γ 8,Θ 1}
Figure 2: Alice is not the murder: B
(
s, t,¬Murderer(Alice)
)
FOL  ⊢  ✓
Γ 6. ∀x (Murderer(x) ↔ Holds(Owns(x,gun),t3))
{Γ  6} Assume ✓
Γ 7. Initially(Owns(Alice,gun))
{Γ  7} Assume ✓
Γ 8. ∀f,t ((Initially(f) ∧ ¬Clipped(t0,f,t)) → Holds(f,t))
{Γ  8} Assume ✓
Γ 4. ∀x,t ((Holds(Owns(x,gun),t) ∧ holds(Owns(y,gun),t)) → (x = y))
{Γ  4} Assume ✓
Γ 3. Murderer(Bob) → ¬Murderer(Alice)
{Γ  3} Assume ✓
Γ 5. Alice ≠ Bob
{Γ  5} Assume ✓
Γ 1. Murderer(Alice) ∨ Murderer(Bob)
{Γ  1} Assume ✓
Γ 2. Murderer(Alice) → ¬Murderer(Bob)
{Γ  2} Assume ✓
Θ 2. Happens(Sold(Alice,Bob,gun),t3)
{Θ 2} Assume ✓
Θ 1. ∀x,y,thing,t (Happens(Sold(x,y,thing),t) → (Clipped(t0,Owns(x,thing),t) ∧ Holds(Owns(y,thing),t)))
{Θ 1} Assume ✓
11. Murderer(Bob) ∧ ¬Murderer(Alice)
{Γ  1,Γ 2,Γ 3,Γ 4,Γ 5,Γ 6,Γ 7,Γ 8,Θ 1,Θ 2}
Beliefs of s
 
⇥2
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